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H I G H L I G H T S
• The U.S. government has invested $3 billion in wind research since 1976.• Analysis demonstrates sizable, positive returns on this past wind research.• Net benefits equal $31.4 billion, leading to an 18 to 1 benefit-to-cost ratio.• Avoided carbon dioxide emissions are estimated at 1510 million metric tons.• Alternative methods & assumptions yield benefit-to-cost ratios of 7-to-1 to 21-to-1.
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A B S T R A C T
The U.S. government has invested in wind energy research since 1976. Building on a literature that has sought to
develop and apply methods for retrospective benefit-to-cost evaluation for federal research programs, this study
provides a quantitative analysis of the economic social return on these historical wind energy research invest-
ments. Importantly, the study applies multiple innovative methods and varies important input parameters to test
the sensitivity of the results. The analysis considers public wind research expenditures and U.S. wind power
deployment over the period 1976–2017, while also accounting for the full useful lifetime of wind projects built
over this period. Assessed benefits include energy cost savings and health benefits due to reductions in air
pollution. Overall, this analysis demonstrates sizable, positive economic returns on past wind energy research.
Under the core analysis and with a 3% real discount rate, the net benefits from historical federal wind energy
research investments are found to equal $31.4 billion, leading to an 18 to 1 benefit-to-cost ratio and an internal
rate of return of 15.4%. Avoided carbon dioxide emissions are not valued in monetary terms, but are estimated at
1510 million metric tons. Alternative methods and input assumptions yield benefit-to-cost ratios that fall within
a relatively narrow range from 7-to-1 to 21-to-1, reinforcing in broad terms the general finding of a sizable
positive return on investment. Unsurprisingly, results are sensitive to the chosen discount rate, with higher
discount rates leading to lower benefit-to-cost ratios, and lower discount rates yielding higher benefit-to-cost
ratios.
1. Introduction
Technological innovation has played a pivotal role in past trans-
formations of the energy supply system, leading to major shifts in the
primary sources of energy and enabling the provision of energy services
at affordable levels despite enormous growth in demand [1]. Further
innovation is crucial if these trends are to continue, especially if am-
bitions for decarbonization are to be realized (e.g., [2]). For many
years, there have been calls for increased public research and devel-
opment (R&D) in the energy sector (e.g., [3,4,5]). Privately funded R&D
is limited by the market failure whereby companies carrying out R&D
incur the full costs of their efforts but cannot capture the full benefits
because of spillovers to other firms [6,7]. Therefore, publicly funded R&
D is justified as a means to counteract this market failure.
The response to these calls for increased publicly funded energy R&
D has been tepid to date—R&D has not expanded dramatically over the
past several decades. In part, this may be due to uncertainty about the
economic return to these investments, along with concerns that past
public R&D efforts have not always realized their full desired potential
[8,9]. Quantitative evaluations of historical R&D investments are rare,
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and even the methods that might be employed to conduct such eva-
luations remain underdeveloped. Policymakers may be understandably
hesitant to increase R&D expenditures when the past return on invest-
ment is unclear.
This paper partially addresses these information gaps by quantifying
the economic social return on the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s)
historical wind energy R&D investments. Wind energy has expanded
rapidly in recent years, both globally [10] and in the United States [11].
This expansion has been enabled by technological advancements since
the 1970s that have dramatically increased the scale and sophistication
of wind turbines and plants, yielding sizable reductions in the cost of
wind energy [12,13,14]. Wind energy also holds potential for sub-
stantial continued expansion, but the degree of growth will be dictated
in part by additional technical advancements and further cost reduc-
tions [15,16,17]. To date, wind energy has been a significant target for
public R&D expenditure. The U.S. federal government, through the
DOE, has been the largest source for such funding, investing in wind
energy R&D since 1976 with total expenditures (in real 2017$1) of $3.0
billion through 2017. This $3.0 billion represents roughly one third of
all publicly funded wind R&D worldwide over this period, based on
data from IEA [18].
This paper both analyzes the economic social return on DOE’s wind
energy R&D expenditures from 1976 to 2017, and assesses the sensi-
tivity of the findings to various methodological choices and input as-
sumptions. The core approach used in this program-level impacts
analysis builds on a literature that has sought to develop and apply
methods for retrospective benefit-to-cost evaluation for U.S. federal R&
D programs, including NRC [19], Pelsoci [20], and Ruegg et al. [21].
The basic analytic framework for retrospective R&D assessments re-
commended by all of these reports assumes that advancements gener-
ated by the public sector would have been accomplished by the private
sector alone, but with a delay. The methods and assumptions used in
this paper are broadly consistent with the earlier work, while improving
on previous methods with more-accurate data. As points of comparison,
two alternative approaches for estimating the economic return on
DOE’s wind energy R&D investments are employed, in one case
building on the learning curve literature. In addition, the sensitivity of
the results to a subset of the core input assumptions is tested. The al-
ternative methods and sensitivity analyses enhance confidence in the
core findings.
This work complements past efforts to evaluate the impacts of DOE’s
wind energy R&D, and it may inform more-comprehensive future as-
sessments. Past work to independently evaluate aspects of the perfor-
mance of DOE’s wind R&D efforts includes Pelsoci [20]—the most re-
cent previous program-level benefit-to-cost evaluation. Ruegg and
Thomas [22] sought to clarify if, how, and to what extent others have
used knowledge-based outputs from DOE’s wind R&D to further the
commercial development of wind energy. Navigant [23] assessed DOE’s
Wind Powering America program, the goal of which was to educate,
engage, and enable stakeholders to make informed decisions about
wind energy deployment.
This paper makes two key contributions to the broader literature.
First, the paper adds to a global literature that has sought to elucidate
the impacts of public wind R&D. Several studies have qualitatively ex-
amined the successes and challenges of different models for wind R&D
(e.g., [24,25,26]), without attempting to estimate quantitative mea-
sures of the net return on investment. Other work has been more
quantitative, seeking to disentangle the relative impacts of R&D and
deployment-oriented learning on the historical cost of wind (e.g.,
[27,28]), but it has stopped short of translating cost reductions into
measures of the economic return to R&D investments. The work pre-
sented in this paper seeks to fill these literature gaps by quantitatively
assessing the economic return on historical wind R&D. More broadly,
this work also contributes to a literature that seeks to quantify the
benefits and costs of historical public R&D investments, whether fo-
cused on wind or not. It does so, in part, by illustrating the application
of and improvements to a long line of related work that has focused on
energy R&D in the United States. In addition, by comparing the core
results of the analysis with those generated from an innovative new
method that extends two-factor learning curves (2FLCs), this paper
highlights one means of validating or at least enhancing confidence in
the results of historical R&D assessments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
highlights the data and methods used in this analysis, both for the core
method and the two supplementary approaches. The results of the
analysis are then described. The paper ends with a summary of key
findings, along with recommendations for further research to extend
the work presented here.
2. Methods, data, and past research
The methods, assumptions, and data that underlie the analysis are
summarized in this section. Key literature on which the current analysis
builds is also highlighted. First, the core approach is described, starting
with a basic overview of the method applied and the previous literature
that has used similar approaches. The Pelsoci [20] study is then de-
scribed, because it represents the most recent program-level analysis of
DOE’s wind energy R&D investments. With that as background, the
approach taken in this study to build on the previous literature is
summarized. Emphasis is placed on comparing the assumptions and
approaches used in this study to those used in Pelsoci [20]. Finally, two
additional approaches for estimating the economic return to DOE’s
wind energy R&D are described. One is a variant of the core approach.
The other uses very different methods, leveraging the extant literature
on 2FLCs to assess the impact of R&D investments on wind energy’s
levelized cost of energy (LCOE) and, therefore, total deployment costs.
2.1. Core approach: public R&D as an accelerant
2.1.1. General approach
The core analysis presented in this paper builds on past work, and it
views R&D as an accelerant of technology cost reduction and deploy-
ment. NRC [19] first developed and applied this basic framework to
assess the historical return on multiple DOE R&D programs. Ruegg et al.
[21], and following earlier guidance from Ruegg and Jordan [29], built
on this foundation and established more-formalized guidelines for
DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy when con-
ducting program-level R&D impacts assessments. Finally, Pelsoci [20]
used an approach generally consistent with these guidelines to assess
the economic return to DOE’s past wind energy R&D investments.
The basic framework for retrospective R&D assessments re-
commended by all of these reports assumes that advancements gener-
ated by the public sector would have been accomplished by the private
sector alone, but with a delay. This is not to say that every public-sector
R&D investment has the same acceleration effect; instead, the im-
plication is that the collective impact of public-sector R&D is to accel-
erate cost reduction and technology deployment. Pelsoci [20], for ex-
ample, conducted extensive stakeholder engagement, finding that
DOE’s wind energy R&D had led to a 6-year acceleration in reducing
wind’s LCOE and a resulting 6-year acceleration in wind deployment.
The NRC [19] study assumed a 5-year acceleration for all DOE pro-
grams assessed.
2.1.2. Overview of the Pelsoci study
The Pelsoci [20] report represents the most recent program-level
benefit-to-cost analysis of DOE’s historical wind R&D investments. The
analysis used multiple metrics, including the net present value (NPV) of
DOE’s investment, benefit-to-cost ratios (BCRs), and internal rate of
1 Unless otherwise specified, all monetary values are reported in real 2017$,
based on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Implicit Price Deflator.
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return (IRR). The analysis was retrospective, covering 1976 to 2008,
and accounted for the “additionality” of the publicly funded R&D by
comparing actual market outcomes with what might have happened
absent DOE’s investments.
More specifically, Pelsoci [20] relied on subject-matter experts and
documentation to judge the combined impacts of a subset of the wind
technology advancements supported by DOE. The four categories of
technologies considered included wind turbulence models, unsteady
aerodynamic experiments, turbine blade material characterization and
modeling, and wind turbine component demonstration. Those specific
investments over the 1976–2008 period represented 72% of DOE’s
overall wind energy R&D budget.
Interviews with experts from research institutes, academia, in-
dustry, and project developers suggested that DOE’s R&D investments
resulted in the use of more sophisticated industrial design processes
that led to higher reliability rates, lower commercial risks, and a lower
cost of wind energy. Based on the judgement of the experts, the com-
bined effect of DOE’s investments was to accelerate wind LCOE re-
duction and wind power deployment by 6 years compared to a coun-
terfactual scenario of no DOE R&D (but with private-sector R&D, and
public-sector R&D from other countries). Absent DOE’s investments,
Pelsoci concluded that, under the counterfactual “next best alternative
technology” scenario, wind turbines would have still been designed
(with a 6-year delay) using trial-and-error methods and crude rules of
thumb; wind turbine component reliability would have been degraded,
resulting in higher outage rates, reduced availability, and higher op-
eration and maintenance expenses; and turbines would have experi-
enced more frequent systemic failures.
The impacts of DOE’s R&D were documented along four di-
mensions—economic, environmental, energy security, and knowl-
edge—with aspects of the first two estimated in monetary terms.
Economic benefits of $3.3 billion (2008$) from energy cost savings
were estimated by multiplying the LCOE reduction caused by DOE’s
investments (via a 6-year acceleration of LCOE trends) in each year by
the (lower) wind generation levels that would have occurred absent a 6-
year deployment acceleration. Additional benefits of $9.8 billion came
from avoided adverse health incidents due to reduced exposure to
particulate matter. These benefits were estimated as the avoided health
costs from the displacement of thermal powerplant operations and re-
lated air emissions due to the additional wind supply caused by the 6-
year deployment acceleration. It was assumed that DOE was responsible
for 80% of these cost and health benefits, due to industry cost sharing,
resulting in $10.4 billion in total benefits. After considering total DOE R
&D expenditure of $1.7 billion, net benefits were calculated at $8.7
billion (2008$) during 1976–2008. These represent cumulative figures,
with no discounting.
Pelsoci [20] then used 3% and 7% real discount rates to estimate the
NPV, BCR, and IRR of DOE’s investment, in one case considering the
entire DOE wind energy R&D expenditure and in another case con-
sidering the 72% of that budget specifically related to the technologies
in question (Table 1). Separate from these monetary estimates, Pelsoci
[20] also estimated the incremental wind generation due to DOE’s in-
vestments, along with the related reductions in carbon dioxide and
sulfur dioxide emissions as well as oil demand.
2.1.3. Conducting an updated analysis of DOE’s wind energy R&D2
The analysis in this paper updates and builds on Pelsoci [20], NRC
[19], and Ruegg et al. [21]. Where this analysis differs from these past
assessments and approaches, clarity is provided on the nature of the
differences, and the reasoning for those differences is explained. Most of
the differences are methodological improvements on the past work.
Table 2 compares the approach and assumptions used in this paper with
those from Pelsoci [20], with notable differences detailed below.
Whereas Pelsoci’s analysis considered impacts through 2008, the
present analysis extends the assessment to consider wind power de-
ployment through 2017. Moreover, due to data limitations, Pelsoci [20]
considered R&D costs back to 1976 but not the benefits associated with
some of the very early years of wind deployment in the United States;
this analysis resolves those data issues and includes wind deployment
from the beginning of the commercial market in 1982 and through
2017 (and R&D investments back to 1976). See Appendix A for the data
on U.S. wind capacity additions used in this analysis.
Pelsoci’s analysis presumes that the same absolute LCOE reduction
that comes from the 6-year acceleration applies to all wind power
production within each given year. This ignores the fact that wind
production in any single year comes from wind power plants built in a
large number of previous years, and each of those plant vintages will
have its own absolute LCOE reduction due to the 6-year acceleration.
The present analysis, instead, estimates for each year the amount of
wind production that comes from plants built in each of the previous
years, and it applies the 6-year LCOE acceleration to each plant vintage
separately. This approach requires estimation of vintage-specific wind
capacity factors, especially in the early years—specifically, starting
point capacity factors,3 and then assumed wind plant degradation after
year 10 to year 20 consistent with Wiser and Bolinger [11]. For later
years, where possible, the analysis relies on project-specific reported
production from the dataset assembled for Wiser and Bolinger [11],
while also assuming 2% annual plant-level degradation after year 10.
These data had not been assembled when Pelsoci’s study was con-
ducted, but they encompass virtually all wind projects in the United
States and so are fully used in the present analysis. The analysis uses
data on annual wind power capacity additions from 1982 through 2017
compiled in current and earlier versions of the annual DOE Wind
Technologies Market Report (e.g., [11]); see Appendix A.
Pelsoci [20] did not include any consideration of effective useful life
(EUL). Specifically, Pelsoci’s analysis extended through 2008, with no
benefits considered after 2008 even for wind power plants built in 2008
Table 1
Summary of core findings from Pelsoci [20].
Metrics based on entire DOE wind energy program investment Metrics based on DOE wind energy investments in selected technologies
Net Present Value at 3% $3.5 billion $3.8 billion
Net Present Value at 7% $0.9 billion $1.1 billion
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio at 3% 3.9 to 1 5.3 to 1
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio at 7% 2.1 to 1 2.8 to 1
Internal Rate of Return 12% 14%
2 All data and calculations, if not otherwise included in this paper or its ap-
pendix, are available from the authors upon reasonable request.
3 Early-year average capacity factors are assumed to start at 15% for plants
built in 1982 (the first year of commercial wind deployment in the United
States), growing to 25%, 30%, and then 33% over time until 1998—at which
point actual plant-specific production data from Wiser and Bolinger [11] are
used (except for projects built in 2017, which, due to lack of production data,
are assumed to have a 45% average capacity factor). Assumed average capacity
factors for plants built from 1982 to 1998 derive from an analysis of historical
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) wind production and capacity
data, as well as early reports from the California Energy Commission sum-
marizing the performance of California wind projects: https://www.energy.ca.
gov/wind/documents/.
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or before. As a result, the Pelsoci assessment ignored 18 years or so of
useful life for wind turbines installed in 2006, given the cutoff of 2008.
Ruegg et al. [21] recommended that DOE impact assessments be con-
ducted both ways: not considering EUL and considering EUL. When
considering EUL, the analyst does not include wind power plants built
after the end year of the assessment (2008 for Pelsoci, 2017 for the
current work), but does consider the remaining useful life of wind
power plants built up to the end year of the assessment (2017 in this
case). The analysis presented in this paper only includes EUL, because
the authors consider this to be the only realistic assumption. Here the
current analysis differs from Ruegg et al. [21], which recommends that
“without EUL” be considered the base case. The Ruegg et al. re-
commendation seems unduly conservative, because wind power plants
are built with project lives of 20 years or more, the industry has ex-
perience achieving this target, and the LCOE of wind plants is largely
established in the first year and is passed to customers often through
long-term power sales agreements. Given this context, it is implausible
that R&D benefits that accrue to already-built plants would simply end
at the end of 2017, as assumed in a “without EUL” case. The analysis in
this paper instead follows NRC [19], which considered EUL in its as-
sessment of DOE R&D programs. In terms of the details, a 20-year
project life is assumed for projects installed in 2012 and before, with
EUL increasing by 1 additional year each year until a 25-year project
life is assumed in 2017. The wind industry has generally moved to 25-
or even 30-year project life assumptions in recent years, and DOE’s
Wind Energy Technologies Office has assumed a 25-year project life
since 2017.
This paper’s core case follows Pelsoci [20] by applying a 6-year
acceleration of LCOE and wind deployment due to R&D efforts, and
assuming 80% attribution to DOE. By assuming the same 80% attri-
bution factor, this analysis in effect assumes that industry cost sharing
has not substantially changed since the Pelsoci assessment, on a per-
centage basis—discussions with DOE staff suggest that this is a rea-
sonable assumption. The 6-year acceleration assumption not only aligns
with Pelsoci, but it is also generally consistent with the 5-year accel-
eration applied in NRC [19] for DOE’s R&D investments across a broad
array of technologies. Nonetheless, this 6-year acceleration assumption
may be the most important input to the analysis—and perhaps the one
that is most uncertain.
The Pelsoci [20] counterfactual was derived through careful expert
elicitation designed specifically for the period up to 2008—it was not
intended to be used for the post-2008 period of R&D performance. A
decade has passed since Pelsoci’s analysis, and the current analysis does
not draw from new comprehensive industry interviews or new analysis
to validate the 6-year acceleration assumption for more-recent years.
Thus, there is uncertainty about whether this 6-year acceleration is
accurate, especially with extension of the analysis through 2017. As the
industry has matured over the last decade, the relative contribution of
DOE’s R&D to overall industry-wide cost reduction and deployment
acceleration might have declined. At the same time, DOE’s wind R&D
goes well beyond the four technology areas evaluated in Pelsoci [20],
which would be expected to enhance the overall acceleration effect of
DOE funding. External reviewers of this paper offered a range of di-
vergent opinions on the 6-year acceleration assumption.4
Given the uncertainties, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to test
the impacts of varying the acceleration assumption, including 4- and 8-
year accelerations. Moreover, all three levels of acceleration are applied
over the entire analysis period, not only over the timeframe since the
Pelsoci [20] assessment. This reflects underlying uncertainties not only
about the degree of acceleration after 2008, but also uncertainties prior
to 2008. Future expert elicitations could help refine these estimates and
potentially document how the degree of acceleration has changed over
the 40-year duration of DOE’s wind energy investments as the sector
has evolved and as other countries have invested in public-sector wind
R&D.
As summarized previously, Pelsoci’s assessment and the Ruegg et al.
[21] guidance consider acceleration of both LCOE and deployment.
LCOE-related economic benefits were estimated by multiplying the
LCOE reduction caused by DOE’s investments (via the 6-year accel-
eration of LCOE trends) in each year by the (lower) wind generation
levels that would have occurred absent a 6-year deployment accelera-
tion. Environmental benefits from avoided adverse health incidents
were estimated by assessing the health benefits of the additional wind
energy due to the 6-year deployment acceleration and the resulting
reduction in criteria air pollutants, compared with the counterfactual
case. The analysis conducted in this paper applies this same basic ap-
proach for both LCOE and deployment acceleration.
When considering health benefits, Pelsoci [20] focused on the
monetary benefits of reduced health incidences from particulate matter
exposure, using the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Co-
Table 2
Comparison between Pelsoci [20] and the current analysis.
Pelsoci [20] Current analysis
R&D performance period 1976 to 2008, but not fully inclusive of early years 1976 to 2017, inclusive of early years
Wind technologies Focus on four specific areas of DOE investment in land-
based wind
Include impact of all DOE wind R&D expenditures on land-
based wind
Effective useful life Not considered Include EUL in core analysis
Counterfactual 6-year acceleration; 80% attribution to DOE R&D 6-year acceleration; 80% attribution to DOE R&D
Assumed effect LCOE acceleration & deployment effect LCOE acceleration & deployment effect
Treatment of increasing LCOE during period in 2000 s Did not treat this issue Smooth the resulting LCOE curve
Wind plant vintaging No Yes
Real discount rate 7% as primary case, 3% informational 3% as primary case, 7% and undiscounted as informational
Economic benefits included Energy cost and health benefits Energy cost and health benefits
Monetized health benefits EPA COBRA model Midpoint of multiple advanced models, inclusive of COBRA
model
Sensitivity analysis Attribution range of 72% to 88% 4-year and 8-year acceleration
4 External reviewers highlighted a range of opinions about the 6-year accel-
eration assumption. Some reviewers noted the intangible and hard-to-quantify
impacts from DOE’s R&D, specifically mentioning early work to understand the
grid-integration issues associated with wind energy, efforts to establish a future
vision in which wind energy is a meaningful contributor to U.S. electricity
supply, and support for training the next generation of technical and industry
leaders. Other reviewers identified examples in which the impact of DOE’s R&D
was likely well in excess of a 6-year acceleration of what might have been
accomplished without DOE investments, either in enabling cost reduction or in
supporting additional wind deployment. On the other hand, another reviewer
noted that, given public R&D investments in Europe especially, the accelerant
effect of DOE’s unique investments might be somewhat lower, specifically
mentioning 4 years as potentially a best guess. Another reviewer noted that the
degree of acceleration may have shifted over time. These varied and divergent
opinions reflect the uncertainty about the degree of acceleration, and they
justify the approach of assessing assumptions ranging from 4 to 8 years as well
as the later suggestion that new research be conducted to refine and update the
acceleration figures.
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Benefits Risk Assessment (COBRA) model. Ruegg et al. [21] also re-
commended the use of COBRA. The present analysis includes both a
broader set of pollutants and a larger number of (sometimes more ad-
vanced) models, including but not restricted to COBRA—following the
“midpoint” results from Millstein et al. [30]. Millstein et al. [30] is the
most advanced effort to date for estimating the health and environ-
mental benefits of historical wind (and solar) deployment, but it focuses
on the years 2007 to 2015. The current paper extends the analysis to
consider years prior to 2007 and after 2015. This analysis does not use
the Millstein et al. [30] results directly, because that study estimates the
impacts of all U.S. wind deployment; instead, intermediate results are
used to extrapolate findings to the wind deployment acceleration
cases.5
Ruegg et al. [21] also recommended using the social cost of carbon
to estimate monetary benefits from carbon reductions, albeit suggesting
that the results be presented separately. Given current uncertainties
about the proper social cost of carbon to apply within U.S. federal de-
cision making, this analysis instead follows Pelsoci [20] and reports
carbon emissions reductions in physical units. As with health impacts,
Millstein et al. [30] is used and extended in time to assess the carbon
emissions reductions caused by the R&D-induced wind deployment
acceleration.
Estimating an LCOE-acceleration effect requires data on the his-
torical LCOE of wind energy. Historical LCOE data come from DOE [31]
and Wiser and Bolinger [11]. Unlike in Pelsoci [20], these LCOE data
are “smoothed” via interpolation. The LCOE of U.S. wind increased for
a period in the 2000s owing to a variety of unique factors, including
currency exchange rate movements, higher materials input prices and
labor costs, and a supply-demand balance that favored suppliers over
purchasers [32]. Application of a 6-year acceleration assumption during
this period without smoothing leads to the unlikely result that DOE R&
D caused LCOE increases in some years; it seems implausible that DOE
R&D investments helped cause unfavorable currency movements,
heightened materials and labor prices, or global supply-demand im-
balances. The development of an interpolated, smoothed LCOE curve
that adjusts LCOE downward during this period resolves this issue. The
resulting historical LCOE data for land-based wind are shown in
Appendix A. In addition, the estimated reduction in LCOE due to DOE’s
R&D in the 4-, 6-, and 8-year acceleration cases is shown later, in Fig. 7,
for reference.
The DOE direct wind R&D budgets from 1976 through 2017 were
provided by DOE’s Wind Energy Technologies Office (see Appendix A).
Based on available data from 2014 through 2017, 8% is added to these
figures in each year to account for DOE staff and management costs.
The results of the analysis are reported based on cumulative, un-
discounted figures (in 2017$) and based on 3% and 7% real discount
rates (discounting costs and benefits to 1976, in 2017$). NRC [19] re-
ported DOE R&D outcome results using a 0% discount rate, in part due
to the problems of comparing R&D impacts over widely disparate
periods. The Office of Management and Budget has recommended the
use of both 7% and 3% to reflect private and social rates of discount
[33–34]. Ruegg et al. [21] recommend the use of a 7% real discount
rate as the primary case, with 3% as informational. Ultimately, this
paper emphasizes the 3% case, but analysis results also include the 7%
and undiscounted cases. DOE’s investments in wind R&D span four
decades, and interest rates are at present very low by historical
standards. Use of a real 7% discount rate results in severe front-loading,
effectively ignoring recent impacts. Using a 3% real discount rate ap-
pears more appropriate when considering the social impacts of long-
term DOE R&D investment, especially in a relatively low interest rate
environment.
Analytically, the approach (with some abstraction, especially vis-à-
vis the complexities of plant vintaging) can be summarized by the fol-
lowing equations.
= +Present value total benefits PVTBPV cost benefits PVCB PV health benefits PVHB( )( ) ( )
where
= +=PVCB A LCOE LCOE Qr( )(1 )t
t
t a t t a
t
1
= +=PVHB A Q Q MHBr( )(1 )t
t
t t a t
t
1
Meanwhile:
= +=Present value R D costs PVRDC Annual R D costr& ( ) &(1 )t
t
t
t
1
And finally: =Benefit cost ratio BCR PVTB PVRDC( ) /
where
LCOE = levelized cost of energy (albeit, in this simplified equation,
ignoring vintaging complexities)
MHB = marginal health benefits of 1 MWh of wind
Q = quantity of wind energy
A = attribution percentage
t = time
a = rate of acceleration
r = discount rate
The resulting analysis findings may be conservative—understating
the impacts of DOE’s R&D investments. First, the analysis considers the
cost of DOE’s wind energy R&D to equate to its total investments in
wind, inclusive of all areas of R&D focus. While this is consistent with
the core results presented in Pelsoci [20], Pelsoci also notes that the
specific investments that relate to the 6-year acceleration assumption
represent 72% of historical DOE wind expenditures. More broadly,
DOE’s wind R&D has focused on not only land-based wind, but also on
offshore and distributed wind. All such R&D costs are included in the
present analysis, but benefits solely include those that derive from
utility-scale land-based wind. Second, the analysis does not consider
any R&D benefits associated with wind power plants built in 2018 or
after. This assumption is consistent with the guidance in Ruegg et al.
[21], but is highly conservative in that it assumes that R&D benefits do
not “spill over” into future years. NRC [19], in contrast, generally as-
sumed that R&D benefits would persist for an additional 5 years of
technology deployment. Third, while carbon emissions reductions are
reported in physical terms, the present study does not translate those
reductions into monetary benefit estimates. A large and varied litera-
ture has developed to estimate the global and domestic benefits of
carbon reductions, which could in the future be used to extend this
assessment. Fourth, and more generally, while the full DOE wind R&D
budget is included, the current study does not assess or monetize a
number of additional possible benefits that may have emerged from
those expenditures. For example, it does not consider water use, cross-
industry knowledge spillover, or any other possible benefits.
The primary factor that may push in the other direction (toward
overstating the impacts of DOE’s R&D investments) is the acceleration
5 An advantage of Millstein et al. [30] is that it used advanced methods to
establish regional estimates of the marginal emissions reductions and health
benefits of wind energy. To extrapolate those 2007–2015 findings to years prior
to 2007, the current analysis accounts for changes to the regional distribution of
wind power and regional changes to power-sector emissions, as well as popu-
lation and GDP. To extrapolate the findings beyond 2015, the analysis considers
population and GDP growth as well as EIA estimates of power-sector emissions.
The methods and resulting data are available upon reasonable request.
R. Wiser and D. Millstein Applied Energy 261 (2020) 114449
5
assumption. The 6-year assumed acceleration—and the range of
4–8 years—may be too aggressive. At a minimum, it is a core source of
uncertainty in this assessment.
2.2. Alternative approaches to estimating R&D impacts
As points of comparison, two alternative approaches are used to
estimate the economic return on DOE’s wind energy R&D investments.
Both of these approaches focus exclusively on the LCOE acceleration
effect, with no induced wind deployment impacts. First, the analysis
loosely applies the methods established in NRC [19], Ruegg and Jordan
[29], Pelsoci [20], and Ruegg et al. [21], but assumes only an LCOE-
reduction acceleration effect with no wind deployment acceleration.
Second, the analysis leverages the academic literature on 2FLCs, and it
develops three distinct estimates of the economic return on DOE’s wind
energy R&D. These three estimates also focus only on the LCOE effect.
These approaches are not perfectly comparable to the core methods,
described previously, because they capture different impact pathways.
Nonetheless, contrasting the results from different methods can help
assess, in broad terms, the reasonableness of the core results.
2.2.1. LCOE-only acceleration
The core methods described previously assume both LCOE and de-
ployment acceleration, consistent with previous research. However,
alternative scenarios are assessed in which there is only an LCOE effect.
These scenarios consider only economic benefits, presuming that the
lower LCOE due to DOE R&D reduces the cost of all realized historical
wind deployment. There are no incremental health or environmental
benefits associated specifically with DOE R&D, because it is assumed
that those R&D investments reduced the cost of wind power deployed
but not the volume of that deployment. These “LCOE only” scenarios
therefore result in higher LCOE-based economic benefits but no as-
sumed R&D-induced health and environmental impacts.
The assumptions that underlie this approach might be justified if,
for example, wind deployment is primarily the result of policy drivers
that would have existed even absent DOE R&D investment—state re-
newables portfolio standards, for example, or federal tax incentives.
This is an extreme assumption, because both policy and economic dri-
vers have surely been important in motivating wind deployment.
Nonetheless, policy has played a major role, so this approach can be
viewed as a potentially useful bounding case that need not rely on
uncertain estimates of potential health benefits. One other benefit of
these “LCOE only” scenarios is that they can be more readily compared
to the 2FLC results, which similarly only consider LCOE-related bene-
fits.
2.2.2. Two-factor learning curves
Learning curves have been used extensively to better understand
historical cost reductions for a variety of energy-generation technolo-
gies, and in other cases to forecast future costs. In the simplest appli-
cation, single-factor learning curves define a relationship by which
cumulative increases in experience lead to progressively lower costs. As
applied to wind energy or other generation sources, the most common
proxy for “experience” is cumulative installed capacity. With a log-log
formulation being typical, every doubling of cumulative wind power
capacity can be assumed to lead to a specific percentage reduction in
the cost of wind—the learning rate.
Learning curves have a long history within the wind power sector
(e.g., [14,27,28,35]), with recent analyses suggesting slightly below
10% to nearly 20% LCOE reductions for land-based wind for every
doubling of cumulative global capacity [36,37,12,38]. Nonetheless,
learning curves have been criticized. One pertinent criticism is that
single-factor learning curves simplify the many causal mechanisms that
lead to cost reduction, effectively assuming that cumulative installed
capacity is the dominant driver for all cost improvements [39,40,35].
Two-factor learning curves are meant to provide incremental
insight, by explaining historical cost reductions based on two possible
drivers rather than one. Specifically, like a single-factor learning curve,
the 2FLC also includes an experience variable, often using a proxy like
cumulative installed capacity and leading to a learning-by-doing (LBD)
rate. Unlike the single-factor formulation, however, the 2FLC also in-
cludes a variable for “knowledge stock,” often using as proxies cumu-
lative R&D investments and/or patent activity and leading to a
learning-by-researching (LBR) rate. Because new knowledge takes time
to diffuse into commercial products and may also become stale over
time, knowledge stock variables often include assumptions for knowl-
edge lag and depreciation.
The basic formulation of a 2FLC in this case is as follows:=LCOE LCOE Q KSQ b c1 , or expressed in logarithmic form as follows:= + +LCOE LCOE b Q c KSlog log log logQ 1
=LR 1 2LBD b
=LR 1 2LBR c
where
LCOEQ = levelized cost of wind energy at cumulative installed ca-
pacity Q
LCOE1 = levelized cost of wind energy for the first unit (Q = 1)
b = experience parameter associated with cumulative installed ca-
pacity (Q)
c = experience parameter associated with cumulative knowledge
stock (KS)
LRLBD = learning-by-doing learning rate
LRLBR = learning-by-researching learning rate
A number of researchers have constructed and/or discussed 2FLCs
for wind energy, including Wiesenthal et al. [41], Wiesenthal et al.
[42], Yu et al. [43], Wiebe and Lutz [44], Miketa and Schrattenholzer
[45], Kobos et al. [46], Jamasb [47], Söderholm and Sundqvist [48],
Söderholm and Klaassen [49], Ek and Söderholm [39], Klaassen et al.
[50], Goff [51], Grafström and Lindman [52], Cory et al. [53], Lindman
and Söderholm [27], Rubin et al. [28], and Kahouli-Brahmi [54]. These
authors have used a variety of specifications and data sources, making
comparisons difficult. More generally, there are various challenges to
constructing 2FLCs. For example, much of the work conducted to date
has focused on explaining the upfront installed cost of wind energy, not
the more relevant metric of all-in levelized costs, considering perfor-
mance changes, operations and maintenance cost reductions, and other
factors beyond installed costs. Moreover, interactions are expected be-
tween experience and knowledge stock, yet interaction terms have
rarely been employed. Incomplete data on wind energy R&D expendi-
tures—whether globally or regionally—often must be used, and
knowledge spillovers across countries, firms, and even different in-
dustrial sectors are not always well thought out or considered. Finally,
in part due to inadequate data on private R&D, most analysts have
focused on the impact of public R&D; more generally, knowledge stock
may be influenced by various factors beyond R&D expenditures that are
otherwise not included in the analysis.
Despite the limitations of this past work, this paper builds on it to
assess the impact of public wind R&D on the cost of wind energy
through 2FLCs, focusing ultimately on the impact of DOE’s wind R&D
investments. In this case, only an LCOE-related effect is included, with
no deployment-oriented impact. The application of 2FLCs in this way is
novel. The authors are unaware of any previous research that has ex-
tended the application of these tools not only to assess the impacts of R
&D on technology costs, but also to develop R&D net-return perfor-
mance measures.
Specifically, this paper estimates the impact of historical global
public R&D knowledge stock on the LCOE of wind energy. The base
assumption is that global public wind R&D knowledge stock is
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equivalent to cumulative global public R&D expenditure on wind re-
ported by IEA [18],6 with a 2-year lag and 3%/year depreciation
(Fig. 1); this assumption is generally consistent with past work. The
analysis then assumes that the per-dollar impact of U.S. public R&D
knowledge stock has been equivalent to the per-dollar impact of other
global R&D knowledge stock in contributing to global knowledge
stock—in effect assuming equivalent marginal impacts from U.S. or
other country investments on the LCOE of wind in the United States.
This may be a conservative assumption, because one might alter-
natively presume that DOE R&D investments have, in part, been tar-
geted towards issues that are unique to the domestic market and so
have had a larger marginal impact on U.S. wind LCOE than the R&D
investments made by other countries. Regardless, the resulting impact
of DOE R&D on land-based wind LCOE over time is then multiplied by
U.S. wind electricity supply to estimate an economic benefit of DOE’s R
&D expenditure. No deployment effect or health benefits are included;
instead, the analysis assumes that the LCOE-related effect applies to the
full amount of historical wind energy supply.
To further bolster confidence in these estimates, three distinct 2FLC
approaches are employed to estimate the likely impact of historical
DOE R&D investments on wind LCOE and therefore overall economic
impacts:
• Literature Review—Shift: This approach leverages the meta-ana-
lysis in Lindman and Söderholm [27]. That study, based on an
analysis of the 2FLC literature at the time, found that inclusion of
knowledge stock in a learning specification resulted in a change to
the single-factor learning-by-doing rate of 2.165 percentage points.
A single-factor learning curve is first established, based on U.S. wind
LCOE and cumulative historical global wind capacity, leading to a
learning-by-doing rate of 16%. The analysis then uses the Lindman
and Söderholm [27] finding that, without global R&D, the single-
factor learning rate would be 2.165 percentage points lower, to
derive an estimated historical wind LCOE had there been no global
wind R&D investments.7 The resulting gap between the “with R&D”
and “without R&D” LCOE estimates over the 1982–2017 period
represents the impact of global wind R&D on historical U.S. wind
LCOE by plant vintage. Finally, the contribution of DOE’s wind R&D
to this total LCOE impact is estimated by multiplying the annual
LCOE gap by the annual estimated contribution of DOE R&D to
global wind knowledge stock (equivalent to the portion of global
knowledge stock derived from DOE wind R&D investments). The
analysis further assumes that the IEA [18] database of global public
R&D investments is incomplete, so it reduces the estimated U.S.
contribution to total global knowledge stock in each year by (an
admittedly somewhat arbitrary) 5%. Based on the method de-
scribed, the U.S. contribution to global knowledge stock, and
therefore to the total LCOE reduction from global wind R&D, is es-
timated to start at 64% in 1980 and decline to 23% by 2017.• Literature review—LBR: This approach builds on the literature re-
view summarized in Rubin et al. [28]. That study finds a median
LBR rate of 16.5% in the available literature, meaning that a dou-
bling of cumulative knowledge stock leads to a 16.5% reduction in
upfront wind energy costs. The present analysis assumes that this
median literature-based LBR rate applies to global public R&D
knowledge stock—again using R&D expenditure data from IEA
[18]—and U.S. wind LCOE.8 With these assumptions, a full 2FLC is
developed that is consistent with the U.S. land-based wind LCOE
estimates, which is then used to estimate U.S. wind LCOE under two
scenarios: with all global R&D and with all global R&D except DOE
R&D. The resulting gap between the “with global R&D” and
“without DOE R&D” LCOE estimates over the 1982–2017 period
represents the estimated impact of DOE’s wind R&D investments on
historical U.S. land-based wind LCOE by plant vintage.• Own Estimates—LBR: Finally, data on U.S. land-based wind LCOE,
global cumulative wind capacity, and global R&D knowledge stock
are used to estimate a new 2FLC unique to the present analysis. This
simple regression yields a LBR rate of 33%, meaning that a doubling
of cumulative global knowledge stock leads to a 33% reduction in
LCOE. Using these 2FLC regression results, U.S. wind LCOE is esti-
mated under two scenarios: with all global R&D and with all global
R&D except DOE R&D. The resulting gap between the “with global R
&D” and “without DOE R&D” LCOE estimates over the 1982–2017
period represents the estimated impact of DOE’s wind R&D invest-
ments on historical U.S. land-based wind LCOE by plant vintage.
Although the estimated LBR rate of 33% is barely statistically sig-
nificant (p-value is ~0.075), alternative knowledge lag and depre-
ciation assumptions yield a wide range of estimated LBR rates, with
results that are often not statistically significant. Results are clearly
very sensitive to assumptions about knowledge lag and deprecia-
tion, and they are not sufficiently precise to pinpoint a firm LBR
rate. In addition, the estimated 33% LBR rate is on the high end of
rates in the available literature, though it is consistent with a similar
U.S.-focused analysis in Cory et al. [53]. One possible reason for the
higher LBR rate found in the present work as well as in Cory et al.
[53] is that both focus on wind LCOE, whereas the remainder of the
literature emphasizes solely project- or turbine-level upfront in-
stalled costs.
The resulting estimated annual LCOE impacts from DOE’s R&D in-
vestments for wind power projects built from 1982 to 2017 are sum-
marized later, in Fig. 7, and are multiplied by appropriately vintaged
wind production data each year (using the same methods described
previously) to estimate monetary savings. The previously described
approaches to EUL and discounting are applied here as well.9
3. Results
To narrow the number of results presented and to enable compar-
isons across scenarios and sensitivities, this paper focuses on BCRs.
Results are also presented in absolute dollar terms in some cases.
Additional results and metrics can be found in Appendix B.
3.1. Core results: 6-year acceleration of LCOE and deployment
The core analysis follows Pelsoci [20] by assuming 6-year accel-
eration of LCOE and wind deployment due to DOE R&D efforts, with
80% attribution to DOE. Using the assumptions and methods described
in Section 2, Table 3 summarizes the core economic return and impact
measures for the assessment.
Focusing on the 3% real discount rate case to calculate present-
value estimates, DOE’s wind R&D investments totaled $1.7 billion.
6 However, the IEA [18] data for DOE wind R&D are replaced with DOE’s own
estimates of its expenditures; in this case, the analysis does not include DOE
staff and management costs.
7 The literature assessed by Lindman and Söderholm [27] applied 2FLCs to
wind plant or turbine installed cost, whereas this paper applies the resulting
2.165 percentage point result to an LCOE-based learning specification. This
paper’s application is likely conservative, because wind LCOE has declined to a
greater extent than upfront installed costs have—and wind R&D has focused on
both cost reductions and performance improvements.
8 The literature on which the 16.5% is based focused principally on wind
plant installed costs, and it used a wide variety of specifications to define
knowledge stock. The application in this paper is likely conservative, because
wind LCOE has declined to a greater extent than upfront installed costs ha-
ve—and wind R&D has focused on both cost reductions and performance im-
provements.
9 The detailed analyses, data, and results for these three approaches are
available upon request.
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Those investments are estimated to have yielded $8.3 billion in energy
cost benefits due to reduced land-based wind LCOE, and an additional
$24.9 billion in health benefits. The total present value of net benefits is
$31.4 billion, with a BCR of 18 to 1 (i.e., 31.4/1.7). Given the 6-year
deployment acceleration, total cumulative wind energy supply is sub-
stantially higher than what would have been achieved absent DOE in-
vestment, also resulting in avoided carbon dioxide emissions of 1510
million metric tons (monetization of the carbon-reduction benefits
would yield a higher BCR). When applying a 7% real discount rate, net
benefits drop to $6.4 billion, with a BCR of 6 to 1. The undiscounted
column in Table 3 shows higher total net benefits or $113.6 billion and
consequently a higher BCR of 38 to 1.
Fig. 2 illustrates the time profile of the R&D investments, the energy
cost benefits, and the health benefits; the resulting IRR is 15.4%. The
deployment-oriented health benefits exceed the energy cost benefits.10
3.2. Varying rates of LCOE and deployment acceleration
Given uncertainty in the 6-year acceleration input, a sensitivity
analysis was conducted by applying 4- and 8-year accelerations as al-
ternative assumptions. Fig. 3 presents the BCRs for the 4-year, 6-year,
and 8-year acceleration cases, considering both energy cost and health
impacts.
Focusing on the 3% discount rate case, the 18 to 1 BCR for the base
6-year acceleration scenario increases to 21 to 1 when assuming 8-year
acceleration, and it drops to 14 to 1 in the 4-year acceleration case.
Naturally, these BCRs decline when a 7% discount rate is used, and they
increase when undiscounted figures are presented. Not shown in the
figure or monetized in this analysis are carbon dioxide emission re-
duction benefits, which increase from 1510 million metric tons in the 6-
year acceleration case to 1790 million metric tons under 8-year accel-
eration, and drop to 1120 million metric tons when assuming 4-year
acceleration.
Overall, these core results fall within a relatively narrow BCR band
of 14-to-1 to 21-to-1, when a 3% discount rate is used. As shown in the
figure, the sensitivity of BCRs to discount rates is higher than the sen-
sitivity of BCRs to the rate of LCOE and deployment acceleration.
Importantly, across all acceleration and discount rate sensitivities, the
economic return to DOE’s wind R&D is found to have been positi-
ve—the lowest BCR shown in Fig. 3 is 5-to-1, indicating benefits that
are 5 times larger than costs.
Fig. 1. Global Wind R&D Expenditures and Knowledge Stock. Notes: Global (and DOE) knowledge stock is equivalent to cumulative global public (and DOE) R&D
expenditure on wind, with a 2-year lag and 3%/year depreciation.
Table 3
DOE wind energy R&D impact summary: 6-year acceleration in LCOE and deployment (1976–2017, with EUL to 2042).
Metric Not Discounted 3% Discount Rate** 7% Discount Rate**
DOE portfolio investment cost (1976–2017, billion 2017$) $3.0 $1.7 $1.1
Monetary value of energy cost benefits (billion 2017$) $27.1 $8.3 $2.2
Monetary value of avoided adverse heath incidences (billion 2017$) $89.5 $24.9 $5.3
Total combined economic benefit (billion 2017$) $116.6 $33.1 $7.5
Present Value of Net Benefits (billion 2017$) $113.6 $31.4 $6.4
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio 38 to 1 18 to 1 6 to 1
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 15.4% 15.4% 15.4%
Increased wind energy generation (1976–2042, GWh)* ←3,180,000→
Percentage decrease in wind generation without R&D investment* ←57%→
Avoided carbon dioxide due to DOE R&D (million metric tons CO2) ←1,510→
* Not adjusted downward to account for 80% attribution assumption.
** Discounted to 1976, in 2017$, based on 3% and 7% real discount rates. Nominal $ are converted to real $ based on the GDP Implicit Price Deflator. The non-
discounted results are also presented in real 2017$.
10 Full details on the results of all the analyses are available on request.
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3.3. Comparison to Pelsoci results
As a point of comparison, Pelsoci [20] estimated an overall BCR
(considering energy cost savings and health benefits) of 3.9 to 1 at a 3%
discount rate. However, the Pelsoci analysis only covered the period
1976–2008, and it did not account for EUL. If the present analysis si-
milarly focuses only on the 1976–2008 period and does not include
EUL, the BCR is 3.2 to 1 at a 3% discount rate. If the period of analysis is
updated to 1976–2017 but EUL is excluded, the BCR increases to 10 to
1. Finally, reflecting the core results presented above, if the full period
and EUL are considered, the BCR is 18 to 1. As such, extending the
timeframe of the analysis and including EUL are both key drivers for the
higher BCRs found in the present analysis when compared to Pelsoci
[20].
3.4. Alternative approach: LCOE-Only acceleration
As described in Section 2, the alternative LCOE-only acceleration
results only consider energy cost benefits, but they presume that the
lower LCOE due to DOE R&D reduces the cost of all realized historical
wind deployment; there are no incremental health benefits, because it is
assumed that R&D investments did not affect the amount of wind de-
ployment and therefore did not directly offset generation from thermal
power plants. As a consequence, the LCOE-only scenarios result in
higher LCOE-based energy cost benefits but no assumed health and
environmental impacts.
Fig. 4 presents the resulting BCRs under 4-, 6-, and 8-year accel-
eration scenarios. Applying a 3% discount rate, the BCR is 12 to 1 when
a 6-year acceleration is used, ranging between 8 to 1 and 18 to 1 when
alternative 4- and 8-year acceleration assumptions are employed. The
BCRs decline when a 7% discount rate is used, and they increase when
no discounting is applied. Overall, these BCRs are in the same general
range as—albeit somewhat lower than—the core results that consider
LCOE and deployment acceleration.
3.5. Alternative approach: two-factor learning curves
Here the core results are compared to the three distinct applications
Fig. 2. Time Profile for DOE Wind R&D Investments and Impacts: 6-year Acceleration in LCOE and Deployment.
Fig. 3. Benefit-to-Cost Ratios for Various LCOE and Deployment Acceleration Assumptions.
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of 2FLCs: literature review—shift, literature review—LBR, and own
estimates—LBR. As described in Section 2, only an LCOE-related effect
is included in these cases, with no deployment-oriented impact.
Fig. 5 presents the results of the three 2FLC analyses, focusing ex-
clusively on BCRs. The two literature-review based estimates are con-
sistent with each other, showing BCRs in a similar range: 9 to 1 (shift)
and 7 to 1 (LBR), when employing a 3% real discount rate. An updated
estimate of a 2FLC leads to a notably higher BCR of 17 to 1 (3% dis-
count rate), but, as indicated previously, the regression results that
underlie this estimate are not especially stable.
The overall range of 2FLC results is broadly consistent with the
LCOE-only acceleration results presented above.
3.6. Comparisons across all results
Fig. 6 illustrates the general consistency among the results of the
alternative approaches and the core results. These various estimates are
not perfectly comparable, because they capture different impact path-
ways. However, the consistency of the results when using very different
methods reinforces, in broad terms, the reasonableness of both sets of
alternative estimates as well as the core results that consider both LCOE
and deployment acceleration. That the core “LCOE and deployment
acceleration” results show somewhat higher economic return measures
in general is, in part, due to the fact that the estimated health benefits of
wind deployment acceleration are higher than the estimated cost-re-
duction benefits of LCOE acceleration, on a per-unit of wind basis.
Finally, each of the approaches used to assess the economic impact
of DOE’s wind R&D investments results in an estimated LCOE ef-
fect—namely, the downward pressure exerted on land-based wind
LCOE due to the investments in public wind R&D. As such, one final
way to illustrate the full set of results is to depict the estimated LCOE
impact of DOE’s wind R&D over time.
Fig. 7 presents these LCOE-reduction estimates, for the 6-year, 4-
year, and 8-year acceleration cases, as well as for each of the 2FLC-
based analyses. Each line represents the estimated contribution to land-
based wind LCOE reduction over time of DOE’s wind R&D investments.
As shown, there are considerable differences in the estimated im-
pact of DOE’s wind energy R&D on LCOE, especially in the 1980s and
1990s. The imprecision in the early-year estimates does not, however,
have a dramatic impact on the resulting BCRs—especially in the case of
a 3% discount rate—because relatively little wind energy deployment
occurred in these early years. In more recent years, there is more
Fig. 4. Benefit-to-Cost Ratios for Various LCOE-Only Acceleration Assumptions.
Fig. 5. Benefit-to-Cost Ratios for Two-Factor Learning Curve Assessment.
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agreement among the estimated LCOE impacts of DOE’s R&D invest-
ments, ranging from $4/MWh to $9/MWh for wind projects built in
2017 based on the 2FLC-based approaches, and equaling $12/MWh in
the 6-year acceleration case (ranging from $9/MWh to $14/MWh when
considering the 4-year and 8-year acceleration cases, respectively).
4. Summary of findings
This study assesses the economic return on the U.S. Department of
Energy’s historical wind energy R&D investments, testing the sensitivity
of these findings to various assumptions and approaches. The analysis
builds on the basic framework developed and applied in earlier work to
conduct retrospective assessments of U.S. energy-related research in-
vestments, and it employs two-factor learning curves to provide another
means of estimating impacts.
The analysis demonstrates sizable, positive economic returns on the
U.S. federal government’s wind energy R&D. The core analysis assumes
a 6-year acceleration of wind cost reductions and deployment, leading
to an estimated benefit-to-cost ratio of 18 to 1 when a 3% real discount
rate is used and both energy cost and health benefits are considered.
Avoided carbon dioxide emissions are not valued in monetary terms,
but they are estimated at 1510 million metric tons. For reasons
discussed previously, the results may be conservative—understating the
impacts of these R&D investments.
In recognition of the uncertainty in the degree of acceleration, al-
ternative cases of 4-year and 8-year acceleration are explored. Focusing
on the 3% discount rate case, the 18 to 1 benefit-to-cost ratio for the
base 6-year acceleration scenario increases to 21 to 1 if 8-year accel-
eration is assumed, and it drops to 14 to 1 in the 4-year acceleration
case. Carbon dioxide emission reduction benefits increase to 1790
million metric tons under 8-year acceleration, and they drop to 1120
million metric tons when assuming 4-year acceleration. Overall, these
results fall within a relatively narrow band of benefit-to-cost ratios,
ranging between 14 to 1 and 21 to 1, when a 3% discount rate is used.
The sensitivity of the results to discount rates is also tested, with higher
discount rates leading to lower benefit-to-cost ratios, and lower dis-
count rates yielding higher benefit-to-cost ratios.
To enhance confidence in the core findings, two alternative ap-
proaches to estimating the economic return on wind energy R&D in-
vestments are applied, both of which focus exclusively on the cost-ac-
celeration affect with no assumed deployment impact. The resulting
benefit-to-cost ratios from the alternative approaches range between 7
to 1 and 18 to 1 when a 3% discount rate is used—within the same basic
range as the core results. These various estimates are not perfectly
Fig. 6. Comparison of Core Results to Alternative Approaches: 3% Discount Rate.
Fig. 7. Land-based Wind LCOE Reduction Due to DOE Wind R&D Investments.
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comparable, because they capture different impact pathways. However,
the consistency of these results when using very different methods re-
inforces, in broad terms, the reasonableness of the basic findings of this
analysis.
5. Recommendations
These results suggest that continued—and even expanded—publicly
funded wind energy R&D may be warranted. The economic returns to
past investments have been sizable, and those results are robust across
varying input assumptions and analytical approaches. In addition, de-
spite the growing maturity of the wind power industry, substantial
opportunities remain for continued advancements and cost reductions,
both for land-based wind and offshore wind (e.g., [55,13,36]).
That said, this is not the final word on the subject. Past results do
not guarantee future performance. Moreover, additional independent
analysis and validation could help refine the estimates presented in this
paper, whereas other methods might be used to deepen understanding
of what kinds of wind energy R&D investments are most likely to have
maximum positive impact.
In relation to improving the economic return measures presented in
this paper, several opportunities deserve special mention. First, one of
the most uncertain parameters is the degree of acceleration in land-
based wind cost reductions and deployment, which may have changed
over time as the industry has matured and the role of the U.S. gov-
ernment’s R&D portfolio has shifted. Additional industry and expert
interviews to validate or revise the previously used 6-year acceleration
assumption would be valuable. Second, further validation or revision of
the assumption that 80% of the impacts are attributable to public
funding (vs. industry cost-share of that public funding) also has merit.
Third, additional effort could further improve the representation of air
emissions health benefits. Specifically, as federal guidelines for the
treatment of carbon emissions reductions come into focus, it may be
warranted to monetize the benefits of these reductions. Fourth, other
possible societal benefits not covered in the present work might also be
assessed. Finally, the estimates presented for a U.S.-based two-factor
learning curve are imprecise, and they lack strong statistical sig-
nificance or model stability. Future work could seek to improve this
two-factor learning curve model by including additional possible ex-
planatory variables (e.g., steel prices, currency movements), testing
additional knowledge depreciation and lag assumptions, incorporating
interaction terms, considering private R&D investments, and/or asses-
sing other possible improvements to the statistical model.
In addition to further validating and improving the numerical eco-
nomic estimates presented in this paper, completely different types of
research are needed to better judge what specific wind R&D invest-
ments are most likely to yield the greatest positive returns. Should wind
R&D focus on land-based or offshore technologies? What specific sci-
entific and technical challenges ought to be tackled with public R&D?
The present analysis was performed at an aggregate, portfolio level, so
it does not answer these important questions. To inform investment
strategies, detailed evaluations of past targets of wind R&D would be
helpful—revealing what specific R&D efforts have worked well and
which have not. Close engagement with and reviews from the private
sector will likely remain essential to these efforts, as will collaborations
with R&D institutions around the world given the now-global scale of
the wind sector.
The basic analytical approaches refined and employed in this paper
are applicable to a broad array of energy R&D investments, not just
wind. Applying the methods more broadly and in as comparable a
fashion as possible to many energy technologies—such as solar, bio-
mass, geothermal, natural gas, coal, nuclear, and energy efficiency—-
would help policymakers judge the relative success of R&D investments
across the full technology portfolio. Some adjustments to the approach
would likely be needed when applied beyond wind, to reflect unique,
technology-specific details. Nonetheless, the present analysis suggests
several areas of focus for further assessments. First, given the im-
portance of the acceleration, attribution, and useful-life assumptions, a
common set of standardized methods would ideally be employed to
estimate these parameters for each technology assessed. Second, be-
cause of the sensitivity of the results to discount rates, future analyses
would benefit from further considering appropriate discounting prac-
tices. Third, comprehensive and defensible underlying data on cost,
deployment, and other factors are essential to these evaluations, and
more effort may be needed to ensure adequate tracking of such details.
Fourth, all quantifiable benefits and costs should be included in such
assessments; where benefits or costs cannot easily be monetized, they
should be described. Finally, the current paper includes novel use of
two-factor learning curves to assess the impacts of R&D on technology
costs and develop R&D net-return performance measures. While there
are limitations to this method, it offers a useful benchmark for the core
analysis approach. Work to refine this basic method is justified, to as-
sess whether it might have wider applications in other R&D assess-
ments. Whether or not two-factor learning curves are applied, com-
prehensive sensitivity analyses are warranted to clarify the robustness
of the resulting economic-return estimates.
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Appendix A. Summary of subset of key analytic input parameters
Year DOE wind energy R&D budget (million, real 2017$)* Land-based wind LCOE (real 2017$/MWh)** U.S. wind power capacity additions (GW)***
1974 0 909 na
1975 0 858 na
1976 49 807 na
1977 72 756 na
1978 111 705 na
1979 166 654 na
1980 155 604 na
1981 181 553 0.0
1982 76 502 0.1
1983 66 451 0.2
1984 54 400 0.4
1985 56 349 0.4
1986 48 310 0.2
1987 31 270 0.1
1988 16 242 0.0
1989 15 213 0.0
1990 15 185 0.1
1991 18 165 0.1
1992 34 145 0.0
1993 38 125 0.0
1994 47 114 0.0
1995 68 109 0.0
1996 46 104 0.0
1997 42 99 0.0
1998 46 94 0.1
1999 48 89 0.9
2000 44 80 0.1
2001 54 75 1.7
2002 51 73 0.4
2003 54 71 1.7
2004 51 68 0.4
2005 50 66 2.4
2006 46 65 2.5
2007 57 63 5.3
2008 56 62 8.4
2009 61 61 10.0
2010 89 59 5.2
2011 87 58 6.6
2012 99 57 13.3
2013 91 56 1.1
2014 92 54 4.9
2015 110 50 8.6
2016 97 46 8.2
2017 90 47 7.0
*DOE program management costs are assumed to add 8% to these annual figures, based on DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE) budgets for 2014–2017 (https://www5.eere.energy.gov/office_eere/program_budget_formulation.php). This covers DOE staff and manage-
ment costs and assumes proportional allocation of those costs across all DOE EERE program areas.
**Historical land-based wind LCOE derives from data in DOE [31] and Wiser and Bolinger [11], with interpolation to “smooth” the data from
1995 to 2013.
***Historical U.S. wind power capacity data come from various versions of the U.S. DOE Wind Technologies Market Report: https://emp.lbl.gov/
wind-technologies-market-report.
Appendix B. Detailed summary of analysis results
Pelsoci
Extension, 6-
year LCOE &
Deployment
Acceleration,
with EUL (base
case)
Pelsoci
Extension, 4-
year LCOE &
Deployment
Acceleration,
with EUL (sensi-
tivity)
Pelsoci
Extension, 8-
year LCOE &
Deployment
Acceleration,
with EUL (sensi-
tivity)
Pelsoci
Extension, 6-
year LCOE-
only
Acceleration,
with EUL (al-
ternative)
Pelsoci
Extension, 4-
year LCOE-
only
Acceleration,
with EUL (sen-
sitivity)
Pelsoci
Extension, 8-
year LCOE-
only
Acceleration,
with EUL (sen-
sitivity)
2-Factor
Learning
Curve,
Literature
Review-Shift
(alternative)
2-Factor
Learning
Curve,
Literature
Review-LBR
(alternative)
2-Factor
Learning
Curve, Own
Estimates-LBR
(alternative)
R&D performance
period
1976–2017, EUL
to 2042
1976–2017, EUL
to 2042
1976–2017, EUL
to 2042
1976–2017,
EUL to 2042
1976–2017,
EUL to 2042
1976–2017,
EUL to 2042
1976–2017,
EUL to 2042
1976–2017,
EUL to 2042
1976–2017,
EUL to 2042
Assumed effect LCOE and de-
ployment accel-
eration
LCOE and de-
ployment accel-
eration
LCOE and de-
ployment accel-
eration
Only LCOE ac-
celeration
Only LCOE ac-
celeration
Only LCOE ac-
celeration
Only LCOE
reduction
Only LCOE
reduction
Only LCOE re-
duction
Benefits included Energy cost &
health benefits
Energy cost &
health benefits
Energy cost &
health benefits
Only energy
cost benefits
Only energy
cost benefits
Only energy
cost benefits
Only energy
cost benefits
Only energy
cost benefits
Only energy
cost benefits
R&D cost (undis-
counted)
$3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.3 Billion
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R&D cost at 3% $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion $1.7 Billion
R&D cost at 7% $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion $1.1 Billion
Benefits (undis-
counted)
$116.6 Billion $92.4 Billion $134.1 Billion $66.1 Billion $43.4 Billion $94.6 Billion $55.2 Billion $41.8 Billion $103.2 Billion
Benefits at 3% $33.1 Billion $26.3 Billion $37.8 Billion $21.1 Billion $13.6 Billion $30.4 Billion $15.0 Billion $12.1 Billion $30.0 Billion
Benefits at 7% $7.5 Billion $6.0 Billion $8.3 Billion $6.2 Billion $3.9 Billion $8.8 Billion $3.2 Billion $2.9 Billion $7.2 Billion
Net benefits (undis-
counted)
$113.6 Billion $89.4 Billion $131.1 Billion $63.1 Billion $40.4 Billion $91.6 Billion $52.2 Billion $38.8 Billion $100.2 Billion
NPV at 3% $31.4 Billion $24.5 Billion $36.1 Billion $19.4 Billion $11.9 Billion $28.7 Billion $13.3 Billion $10.3 Billion $28.2 Billion
NPV at 7% $6.4 Billion $5.0 Billion $7.3 Billion $5.1 Billion $2.9 Billion $7.7 Billion $2.1 Billion $1.8 Billion $6.1 Billion
BCR (undiscounted) 38 to 1 30 to 1 44 to 1 22 to 1 14 to 1 32 to 1 18 to 1 14 to 1 34 to 1
BCR at 3% 18 to 1 14 to 1 21 to 1 12 to 1 8 to 1 18 to 1 9 to 1 7 to 1 17 to 1
BCR at 7% 6 to 1 5 to 1 7 to 1 6 to 1 4 to 1 8 to 1 3 to 1 3 to 1 7 to 1
Carbon reduction 1510 million
metric tons CO2
1120 million
metric tons CO2
1790 million
metric tons CO2
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Note: All dollars are expressed in real 2017 terms.
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